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Abstract
We rst show that quality of consumption is an important de-
terminant of fertility and labor supply. Taking this observation into
account and using a general equilibrium model with vertical quality
dierentiation and heterogeneous labor, we show how low fertility may
persist. This occurs because product quality and skilled labor supply
adjust, never realizing the change in labor productivity necessary to
reverse declining fertility.
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11 Introduction
This paper consists of two parts. First, we present a model of consumer
choice where children and consumption experience require both goods and
time. We demonstrate how change in marginal utility of consumption and
change in wages generate dierent relationship between fertility and labor
participation, i.e., possible source of the dierence between cross section and
time series. In the second half, we embed a simplied version of this con-
sumer into a general equilibrium model with heterogenous labor and verti-
cally dierentiated products. Through comparative statics, we analyze the
cause and implications of low birthrate in the long run. We show that the
feedback mechanism of the economy may not reverse the declining birthrate,
contradicting an implication of the Easterlin Hypothesis cohort eect. This
is because the labor market structure and product market adjusts to change
in birthrate and thus the cohort eect never materializes.
This paper is in the spirit to papers in growth and trade that take into
account the reaction of the economy in the long run (Acemoglu (1998), Flam
and Helpman (1987), Thoenig and Verdier (2003)). Acemoglu (1998) showed
that while in the short run, labor input is reduced in response to scarcity of
skilled labor and high wages, skilled labor supply increase in response triggers
technological change that makes skilled labor even more productive, raising
skilled labor wage in the long run. Our analysis suggests that a similar long
term adjustment of the economy will prevent a natural feedback mechanism
from working. That is, smaller population will increase marginal product of
labor more productive in the short run but consumption pattern will change
in the long run reducing such an advantage.
12 Re-examination of female labor participa-
tion - birthrate relationship
Large Time series among many OECD countries show negative relationship
between female labor participation and TFR (Figure 1) , while cross coun-
try in 2005 (average of years 1985-1996 as well as year 2000, Sleebos (2003),
d'Addio and d'Ercole (2005), Da Rocha and Fuster (2006)) show a positive
relationship. In Japan, although time series relationship has been negative
for 1980 - 2000 (Figure 1) , cross section among prefectures show positive
relationship in 1987 and 2002 (Figure 2). Obviously conditions that dif-
fer across regions in Japan are dierent from dierence between two points
in time. We also note that countries with high per capita GDP have low
birthrates (Figure 3), suggesting low fertility may be correlated with high
consumption. In this section we introduce a consumer optimization model
to capture dierences in income dierence and quality of consumption.
We assume that a utility of a household depends on number of children,
n, consumption of a good x. Both child rearing and consumption of a good
requires time. Number of children is determined by amount of good xc, and
time devoted, `c,
n = f(xc;`c); fx > 0;f` > 0:
Subscripts on functions denote partial derivatives. The utility of consumer is
actually determined by amount of z, which is consumption experience that
depends on amount of the good, x, and time devoted, `,
z = g(x;`); gx > 0;g` > 0:
Utility function is,
u(n;z);un > 0;uz > 0:
Budget constraint depends on price of good and wage, and labor endowment,
 `,
px + pxc + w` + w`c = w `:
Figure 4 demonstrates the optimization problem. The opportunity set is
2dened as,

(z;n)jn = f(xc;`c); z = g(x;`); p(x + xc) + w(` + `c) = w `
	
:
The frontier is downward sloping (see Appendix). It re
ects the budget
constraint as well as the technologies, g and f.
We further index consumption ( consumption experience) by quality, Q.
Utility function is
u(Qz;n)

















Equation (1) implies less labor intensive consumption and child rearing method
will be used when wage increase. The time series of female wage has been ris-
ing in Japan would lead to less labor intensive methods which means greater
labor participation. Equation (2) implies better quality of consumption leads
to more consumption and less children.
Higher wage but not signicantly higher quality means positive relation-
ship. However with the same higher relative wage and higher quality con-
sumption means negative relationship between labor participation and fer-
tility. Availability of consumption goods, such as entertainment and restau-
rants, is much greater in larger cities. This means higher Q, meaning less
children and more consumption in cities.1
1For instance, there are 191 Tokyo restaurants listed in the Michelin restaurant guide,
compared to 64 in Paris and 42 in New York (Robinson (2007)). Same hours spend at a
Tokyo restaurant yields higher Qz on the average compared to other locations in Japan.
33 General Equilibrium with high quality prod-
uct and heterogenous labor
In this section we analyze a general equilibrium in which consumers have a
utility function that re
ect the previous analysis, although somewhat sim-
plied. Consumers dier by two attributes, their preference and quality of
labor. Consumers choose either to consumer high quality product or stan-
dard (low quality) product. Child bearing choice dier according to which
product they choose, as well as if they are skilled or not. Skilled workers
produce the high quality product and the labor supply level determine the
level of quality.
Consumers
We simplify the consumer's problem so that she chooses between consump-
tion (x) and childbearing (n). Her preference is represented by the following





 ; 0 <  < 1: (3)
Consumers preference, , is distributed uniformly over [0,1]. Consumption
good is either the standard (low quality) Q = 1 or high quality Q > 1.
Consumer's labor endowment is  ` and wage is w which is also the oppor-
tunity cost of children. Denoting price of the good by p, consumer chooses
consumption and number of children to maximize (3) with respect to the
budget constraint,
px + wn = w `:
Each consumer's consumption and number of children given quality Q is























4Consumption is increasing and number of children is decreasing in quality,
as in the previous section. The indirect utility is,











The consumer must choose which quality to consume. If her marginal utility
from more consumption is relatively large, she devotes less resources to chil-
dren and has fewer children. If the quality is low and not as benecial, she
derives utility by having many children. She compares the utility levels from
consuming each quality and buys whichever yields higher utility. We denote
the prices of the goods with dierent qualities by pH and pL. Consumer will
buy the high quality good when
v(pH;w;Q) > v(pL;w;1):
This condition is equivalent to,








Since  > 1, there will be no demand for the low quality good if ln
pH
pL < lnQ.
This occurs if low quality product is more expensive ( pL  pH) since Q > 1
and pH > pL but the price premium for the high quality is small relative to
dierence in quality. It does not depend on the level of income.
Consumer's labor supply is the hours not devoted to raising children,








The labor each consumer supplies is either skilled (s) or unskilled (u). There
are total of N consumers, and  2 (0;1) of the consumers are skilled. Labor
endowment,  `, is the same for both types. We denote wages for skilled and
unskilled by ws and wu. Production technology is constant returns to scale
5in labor: one unit of skilled labor produces one unit of high quality product
and one unit of unskilled labor produces one unit of the standard product.
Furthermore we assume both products are supplied competitively. Thus we
have pH = ws and pL = wu.
One skilled worker's demand for high quality product is , denoting relative
wage by  = ws
wu > 1 and using (4),
x
H

















;  > ^ :
There will be positive demand for the low quality only if  > 1 since  =
pH
pL.
We make the following observation
Claim 1. High skilled consumers consume more of both quality, xH
s () >
xH
u () and xL
s() > xL
u().
Total demands from all the skilled workers for high quality product and
low quality product are ,
X
H





















 (Q1  + 1)












;  > ^ :
















Since production of one unit of good requires one unit of labor, demand for





s () = NX
H





u () = NX
L
s () + (1   )NX
L
u(): (8)
Labor supply is constructed in a similar manner from individual supplies.
Individual labor supply as function of relative wage is , using (6) ,
`
H













;  > ^ 
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;  > ^ :
Aggregation yields the total labor supply of each type,
L
S

























It is easy to show, from (5), that ^  is decreasing in  that LD
s and LS
u is
decreasing in  = ws
wu and LS
s and LD
u are increasing in . Equilibrium relative




s () = L
S
s():
The unskilled labor market has cleared by Walrus Law.
7Comparative statics
We rst see how the equilibrium labor supply and relative wage change with
quality.
Claim 2. (i) LS
s, LS
u and LD
s are increasing and LD
u are decreasing in Q.
(ii) Equilibrium relative wages and level of skilled labor are increasing in
quality. That is, @(Q)=@Q > 0 and @L
s(Q)=@Q > 0.
(See Figures 5 and 6. Proof is in the Appendix.) Higher quality makes
consumption attractive for skilled workers and also increase proportion of all
workers that consumer the high quality product. Thus both demand and
supply of skilled labor is increasing in quality. The same eect increases
the supply of unskilled workers and reduces demand for low quality good.
The latter eect implies demand for unskilled workers decreases when quality
improves.
Skilled labor supply is increasing in population, @LS
s=@N > 0, from (9)
and demand is also increasing in population, @LD
s =@N > 0, from (7). (See
proof of Claim 2 in the Appendix.) This implies
Claim 3. Both equilibrium skilled and unskilled labor will increase when
population increases, @L
s=@N > 0 and @L
u=@N > 0.
Again, using the proof of Claim 2 in the Appendix, both demand and
supply of skilled labor is also increasing in proportion of skilled consumers,
@LS
s=@ > 0, from (9) and @LD
s =@ > 0, from (7).
Claim 4. Equilibrium skilled labor and equilibrium relative wage are increas-
ing in the proportion of skilled consumers,@L
s=@ > 0 and @=@ > 0.
8Birthrate
Individual number of children are,
n
H













;  > ^ 
n
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;  > ^ :
It is clear that for given wage level, those that consume high quality good
devoted even more resources for consumption and thus reduce number of chil-
dren when quality improves. Since the equilibrium relative wage in increasing
in quality, we can say the following,
Claim 5. (i) Skilled consumers have less children . That is , nH
s < nH
u for
 < ^  and nL
s < nL
u for  > ^ .
(ii) Skilled consumers have less children when quality of product improves.
That is, dnH
s =dQ < 0 for  < ^  and dnL
s < dQ<0 for  > ^ .
(iii) Unskilled consumers that consume low quality product have the same
number of children when quality improves. That is, dnL
u=dQ = 0 for
 > ^ .
Although there is the income eect, the substitution eect dominates
and skilled workers that consumer low quality reduce number of children.
For unskilled consumers that bought high quality good, improvement makes
consumption more attractive (reduce children) but their relative wage be-
comes lower and the substitution eect works in the opposite direction. The
total eect is not clear.
9Endogenous quality
Assume that level of quality is increasing in the size of the skilled labor.
That is, Q = QT(Ls) is an increasing function of Q. Subscript T refers to
\technology" which is what this relationship re
ects. We will denote the
inverse relationship between the market equilibrium supply of skilled labor
and quality of L
s(Q) by Q = QM(Ls), which is an increasing function from
Claim 2. The equilibrium level of labor L
s and equilibrium level of quality,
Q = QM(L
s) = QT(L
s), is the intersection of the two curves.
When marginal increase in quality from labor is very large, then the
equilibrium is unstable. Graphically, this would mean slope of QT is steeper
than QM (Q0
T > Q0
M) . This is the case around equilibrium E1 in Figure 7.
A perturbation away from E1 results in either spiral increase in quality and
skilled labor supply or decrease of quality and skilled labor supply. When
technology is mature so that marginal quality improvement is very small,
then equilibrium is stable (Q0
T < Q0
M) . This is equilibrium E2 in Figure 7.
There may be multiple equilibria, some stable and others unstable. A slight
perturbation from low quality with small skilled labor force will start a spiral
of labor and quality improvement until E2 is reached.
Now using Claim 3, we analyze the eect of declining population. The
claim implies that the QM(Ls) function will shift upward in the Ls Q space
(Figure 8).
Claim 6. (i) If the technology is in its infancy, then equilibrium quality













(ii) If the technology is mature, then equilibrium quality and skilled labor













When the technology is mature, then declining population results in \con-
10traction" of the economy. That is, quality and supply of skilled labor are
reduced. Claim 5 suggests that lower quality will increase the birthrate. Re-
call that all but unskilled consumers that consumed high quality product will
increase birthrate when quality improves. This situation is consistent with
cohort eect.
The situation is dierent when the technology still has not exhausted in-
creasing marginal returns. The new equilibrium results in more skilled labor
and higher quality. Products are more polarized, skilled labor has higher
relative wages and work more. Utility is derived from more consumption and
there is less children. The cohort eect does not hold because the economy
adjusts to the lower level of population according to the available technology.
Now we consider the eect of more skilled workers, using Claim 4. The
claim implies that the QM(Ls) function will shift downward in the Ls   Q
space (Figure 9). Immediately we have the following,
Claim 7. (i) If the technology is in its infancy, then equilibrium quality
and skilled labor supply decrease when the proportion of skilled workers













(ii) If the technology is mature, then equilibrium quality and skilled labor














Equilibrium quality will decrease (increase) when technology is in its
infancy (maturity). When proportion of skilled consumers increase, each
skilled worker needs to supply less labor to maintain the same quality. When
marginal quality from labor is very large, quality must be lower to accom-
modate it. Lower quality (and lower wage) likely to imply higher birthrate.
Thus when technology is suciently productive, the increasing skilled work-
ers will increase the birthrate. On the other hand when the marginal product
of labor is low, then higher labor implies higher quality. This may reduce
11the birthrate.
Claims 6 and 7 suggest that increasing the proportion of skilled labor can
be eective in reversing decline in birthrate whenever the cohort eect may
not hod. This was the case when marginal return from increasing skilled
labor is large. On the other hand, when the technology is mature, Esterlin
Hypothesis is likely to hold and the same policy will prevent the feedback
mechanism that otherwise will function.
124 Concluding Remarks
We have employed comparative statics of a general equilibrium framework to
understand the long term (stationary equilibrium) eect of declining popula-
tion on the economy, including labor supply and birthrate. We incorporated
vertically dierentiated goods in the general equilibrium model based on the
observation of time series and cross sectional date of birthrate - female labor
participation relationship.
Our analysis suggests that if the technology is productive enough, the
economy will adjust to smaller population and the cohort eect does not re-
verse the trend of declining population. We also showed that increasing the
proportion of skilled consumers (potential workers) can increase birthrate
and reverse the trend precisely when the cohort eect does not hold. We
note that the same relationship between population size and proportion of
skilled consumers means that changing the proportion can prevent the nat-
ural feedback mechanism from functioning when it would have functioned.
The two situations are characterized by if the technology has high marginal
return from skilled labor (infant) or if this has been exhausted (mature).
The economy will correct itself when it is mature, where we also observed
the equilibrium to be stable. Therefore, another possible policy is to let the
technology mature quickly.
Besides extending the model to a dynamic framework, analysis of an econ-
omy such as Japan requires understanding the eect of international trade.
Assuming Japan will export high quality products, trade should reduce the
substitution eect of high quality product while maintaining or increasing the
income eect. This suggests trade by itself could correct the bias towards
consumption and less children. On the other hand, existing trade literature
(Flam and Helpman (1987), Theonig and Verier (2003)) suggest that trade
will lead to greater specialization, particularly in a dynamic framework. This
is left for future research.
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Denoting the Lagrange multiplier by , st-order conditions are,
unfx = p; unf` = w; ungx = p; ung` = w;










When w increases, `c and ` decrease while x and xc increase.
Proof of Claim 2





























































The claim follows from noting that ^  is decreasing in  and increasing in
Q, and that Q1  > 1 for  < ^ .
17Figure 1: TFR and female labor supply 1970,80,85,90,2000 
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Figure 2: TFR and female labor participation ratio by 
prefecture in 1971, 1987, 2002
(Council for Gender Equality, Special Committee on the Decling Birthrate 
and Gender-Equal Participation, 2006b)
NOTE) Pink points are TYPE1(low declining rate in TFR and high level of TFR and female labor supply). Blue points are 
TYPE7(high declining rate in TFR and low level in TFR and female labor supply).
Sources) Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications “Employment Status Survey," National Institute of Population 
and Social Security Research “Indicators of Fertility by Prefecture in 1970-1985,“ and Health, Labor and Welfare Ministry 
“Population Survey Report.”
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Figure 3: TFR and Per Capita GDP
(Council for Gender Equality, Special Committee on the Declining Birthrate and 
Gender-Equal Participation, 2006a)
Source) United Nations Population Fund “State of World Population 



















































Figure 4: Optimization Problem ξ
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Figure 6: Unskilled Labor 
Market
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